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SYMPOSIUM
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
CONSTITUTION-THE TEXT AND BEYOND
FOREWORD
Frederick Davis*
The magnitude of the role which constitutional law plays in keeping the United States the mighty and productive nation that it is cannot be overestimated. In a very serious sense, constitutional law, and its
uniquely American corollary, judicial review, are the tender threads
upon which the whole awesome political venture, initiated only some
200 years ago, depends.'
Those of us who work in other vineyards tend to forget, or, even
worse, to take for granted, the constitutional processes upon which we
all so heavily depend. That is why a symposium such as this is of such
value. It helps to remind all lawyers-not just those who happen to
teach and work in the area of constitutional law-how important these
constitutional processes are to each one of us. It also gives us a helpful
report on the present condition of that universe; a prognosis about
changes which may result from the inevitable social, political, philosophical, and ideological shifts which our society continually undergoes;
and, finally, some observations about how these changes may affect society as we know it today.
We have been warned that there are legislative proposals in the
Congress which could drastically alter the processes to which we have
become accustomed.2 One commentator has deplored the apparent failure of responsible persons to take these proposals seriously, and laments
Dean, University of Dayton School of Law.
I. The briefness of our life as a nation was brought home to me during the bicentennial
celebrations of 1976 when my son asked me how it felt to have lived through 25% of all American
history. If I live to the year 2000 he'll have to make it 33%.
12. Graduation Address by Senator Thomas F. Eagleton, University of Dayton School of
Law (May 16, 1982); Meserve, Limiting Jurisdiction and Remedies of Federal Courts, 68 A.B.A.
J. 159 (1982); Taylor, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdictioz The Unconstitutionality of Current
Legislative Proposals,65 JUDICATURE 199 (1981). But see Anderson, The Government of Courts:
The Power of Congress under Article II!, 68 A.B.A. J. 686 (1982).
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what he calls the absence of "early warning" signals.'
We do not have to look far to see what can happen if popular
devotion to the concept of constitutionally limited government is not
kept vigorous and strong. In the 1950's the legislature of the government of South Africa, by a bare majority vote, removed from the lists
of voters all those who had been officially characterized as "coloured."'
The British South Africa Act, however, which had granted sovereignty
to the Union of South Africa, had a clause which unmistakably required any such action to be taken by at least two-thirds of the members of both houses of the legislature sitting in joint session.5 Since the
government of the Union of South Africa derived its power from the
British South Africa Act, the Appellate Division of the South African
Supreme Court was compelled to rule that the legislative action was
void because it had not followed the procedure clearly established for
the protection of a certain class of voters. 6 Later on, a legislative attempt to nullify the effect of the earlier decision by transferring "jurisdiction" from the regular judicial system to a "court" composed of legislators sympathetic to the disenfranchisement process, was also found
to be in violation of the British South Africa Act."
These two decisions, representing, as they did, the triumph of constitutional principles in protecting fundamental rights from the tyranny
of an ascendant political majority, were widely hailed and celebrated.
Typical of these salutes was the statement of Erwin Griswold, then
Dean of the Harvard Law School:
[T]he steadfast way in which the judges of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of South Africa have twice upheld that constitution has
provided two great landmarks in the field of constitutional law, and in
judicial history, which will strengthen constitutions and the traditions of
the bench in many other places.'
But this great victory was, unfortunately, short lived. The dominant political party, acting by simple majority votes in the two houses
of the legislature, redrew the election laws in such a way as to permit
that party to acquire, by this artifice, the necessary two-thirds legislative majority.' As a result, the coloured voters were ultimately struck
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Friendly, Query: Judges and Journalists; Whose End of the Boat is Sinking?, 65 JUDi-

389 (1982).

4. Separate Representation of Voters Act, No. 46 of 1951.
S. South Africa Act, 1909, ch. 9, §§ 35, 152.
6. Harris v. Minister of the Interior, [1952], 2 S.A.L.R. 428 (App. Div.).
7. Minister of the Interior v. Harris, [1952], 4 S.A.L.R. 769 (App. Div.).
8. Griswold, The Demise of the High Court of Parliament in South Africa, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 864, 872 (1953).
9. Senate Act, No. 53 of 1955.
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from the election lists by a procedure in nominal compliance with the
constitution.' In Collins v. Minister of the Interior," the same Court
which had won such high praise from Dean Griswold and others, was
compelled to surrender, and found itself unable to invalidate the legislatively adopted procedures under which otherwise constitutionally protected interests had been erased.
The sober lesson to be learned from the South African experience
was well summarized by a Canadian scholar:
[I]n none of the crisis situations in the great English-speaking countries
where courts have been involved in power conflicts with executive or legislative authority, have the courts for any considerable length of time
withstood a co-ordinate authority that has had a substantiality of public
opinion behind it.12
We forget such happenings at our peril. Also, if we take too much
for granted that which our heroic predecessors have confided to our
custody, we do that at our peril as well.
This symposium focuses our attention, once again, upon the delicate but vital mechanisms of our constitutional system, and, in so doing, strengthens and benefits that system. We are all very much indebted to the scholars who have contributed so much of themselves in
bringing forth a volume of such conspicuous balance and depth.

10. South Africa Act Amendment Act, No. 9 of 1956.
II. [19571 I S.A.L.R. 552 (App. Div.).
12. McWhinney, Law and Politics and the Limits of the Judicial Process-An End to the
Constitutional Contest in South Africa, 35 CAN. B. REV. 1203, 1208-09 (1957).
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